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TURNING TEXTERS INTO A CIVIL LIABILITY:
TEXTING AND DRIVING BANS AND NEW WAYS
OF EXPANDING LIABILITY ON THE ROAD
I. INTRODUCTION
[Daniel] Gallatin was on his motorcycle on his way to visit his
daughter when he was hit and dragged by an SUV. State police quickly
learned that the driver, Laura Gargiulo, had received a text just moments
before the crash. "This wasn't an accident. This could have been prevented.
Accidents can't be prevented, "saidDaniel'sdaughter, Michelle. According
to courtpapersfiled by state police investigators, the text read, "16 hr day.
I don't get off till 5am. hun. ". . . It was later discovered that the text was

sent by Timothy Fend... [Tihe Gallatinfamily sought legal advice ...
[and].. . Attorney Doug Olcott . . said there is a heavy burden ofproofto
show that a text sendershould be held liable.
The use of a cellphone while driving is undoubtedly distracting but
surprisingly, fatalities in motor vehicle accidents have decreased since the
beginning of the 21st century.2 Although significant efforts have been made
to deter texting while driving, recent cases raise an issue of first impression
to state courts on whether a non-driving texter should be held liable to a

1

See Heather Abraham, Texting & Driving: Can Sender Be Held Liable in Crash?, CBS
PITTSBURGH (Feb. 10, 2017, 6:30 PM), http://pittsburgh.cbslocal.com/2017/02/10/texting-drivingcan-sender-be-held-liable-in-crash/ (describing first of its kind lawsuit potentially broadening
liability of third parties).
2 See Linda C. Fentiman, A New Form of WMD? Driving with Mobile Device and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction, 81 UMKC L. REv. 133, 134-35 (2012) (explaining dangers of
distracted driving yet noting decrease in traffic injuries); see also General Statistics, INSURANCE
INST.

FOR

HIGHWAY

SAFETY,

HIGHWAY

Loss

DATA

INST.,

http://www.iihs.org/iihs/topics/t/general-statistics/fatalityfacts/overview-of-fatality-facts/2015
(drawing statistics of annual motor vehicle fatalities). The Insurance Institute for Highway Safety
(IIHS) and Highway Loss Data Institute (HLDI) are nonprofit scientific and educational
organizations with missions to reduce deaths, injuries, and property damage from motor vehicle
accidents. Id. The organizations compile yearly status reports from data collected by Fatality
Analysis Reporting System (FARS), an agency working under the Department of Transportation.
Id The organization has compiled the data from years 1975 to 2015. Id. Looking at the relevant
period of the 21st century, between 2000 and 2005, there was a number of fatalities ranging from
the lowest at 41,945 in 2000 to the highest at 43,510 in 2005. Id. The following ten years, 2006 to
2015, the highest number of deaths reached 41,259 in 2007 and the lowest number reached 32,479
in 2011. Id
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victim of distracted driving. 3 This Note seeks to explain the history and
creation of the Department of Transportation and the agency's efforts in
creating national safety regulations on highways by comparing efforts to
combat drunk driving with efforts to deter texting and driving.' This Note
will also compare the facts of two similar cases involving third parties
sending texts to drivers and explain the different outcomes of each court's
decision.s Finally, this Note will address the rationales used in the outcome
of each court and will highlight challenges of imposing liability on a nondriving text sender.'
II. HISTORY
In President Lyndon B. Johnson's State of the Union address, he
announced his intent to create a Department of Transportation.' That year,
President Johnson signed the Highway Safety Act and the National Traffic
and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.' The Highway Safety Act of 1966 was later
amended in 1970 to establish a National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA), formerly known as the National Highway Safety
Bureau.' Since 1970, NHTSA has successfully established drunk driving
laws, drinking age laws, seatbelt laws, and recently expanded to prevent
distracted driving."o

See infra Part Ei (posing first impression issue on state courts).
See infra Part II (demonstrating background of United States highway safety regulations).
5 See infra Part In (comparing different court holdings of two similar cases).
6 See infra Parts VI-IV (analyzing courts' decisions and drawing conclusion).
7 See CreationofDepartment ofTransportation- Summary, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. (Feb. 3,
https://www.transportation.gov/50/creation-department-transportation-summary
2016),
(explaining creation of Department of Transportation). President Johnson was inspired by former
Administrator of the Federal Aviation Agency (FAA), Najeeb Halaby, who thought independent
agencies would work efficiently if formed into a federally governed executive department. Id. After
facing criticism from independent agencies like the FAA, President Johnson proposed to Congress
the introduction of the Department as a means to "provide leadership resolution in transportation
'

problems." Id.
8 See Understanding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NIHTSA), U.S.
DEP'T OF TRANSP. (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.transportation.gov/transition/understandingnational-highway-traffic-safety-administration-nhtsa (noting both Acts led to establishing
NHTSA). The principles behind the Highway Safety Act, "helping people chose to drive more
safely," and the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Act, "making vehicles safer," have led the
NHTSA's efforts in saving lives. Id.
(Dec. 31, 1970) (p.1738)
9 See Highway Safety Act of 1970 Public Law 91-605
7 3
4
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-84/pdf/STATUTE-8 -Pgl l .pdf (stating legislative
amendment to create NHTSA).
10 See Understanding the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), supra
note 8 (discussing various areas involved with NHTSA).
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The NHTSA's effort to prevent drivers from texting while driving is
similar to the prevention of drunk driving." In the 1980s, President Reagan
addressed the national issue of drunk driving and created the Presidential
Commission on Drunk Driving in 1982, which influenced social norms
through media and inspired legislators to enact laws to deter drunk driving.12
Similarly, the NHTSA seeks to deter distracted driving and has conducted
studies to determine how to achieve the result effectively." In 2010, the
NHTSA designed a distracted driving demonstration program that was tested
in Syracuse, New York and in Hartford, Connecticut.1 4 The program
monitored the amount of time spent on media messages aiming to raise
awareness of distracted driving laws and the number of citations issued by
officers." The NHTSA's objective in modifying driver behavior was
notably effective in reducing cellphone use by thirty-two percent in Syracuse
and fifty-seven percent in Hartford over a ten-month period.'"

" See Emily K. Strider, Note, Don't Text a Driver: Civil Liability of Remote Third-Party
Texters After Kubert v. Best, 56 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1003, 1021 (comparing drunk driving to
distracted driving).
12 See Executive Order 12358-PresidentialCommission on Drunk Driving, RONALD REAGAN
PRESIDENTIAL

LIBRARY

&

MUSEUM,

(Apr.

14,

1982),

available

at

http://www.reaganlibrary.gov/research/speeches/41482c (declaring President Reagan's intentions
to combat drunk driving). President Reagan stated the Department of Transportation would provide
administrative services for the following functions:
(a) heighten public awareness of the seriousness of the drunk driving problem;
(b) persuade States and communities to attack the drunk driving problem in a more
organized and systematic manner, including plans to eliminate bottlenecks in the arrest,
trial and sentencing process that impair the effectiveness of many drunk driving laws;
(c) encourage State and local officials and organizations to accept and use the latest
techniques and methods to solve the problem; and
(d) generate public support for increased enforcement of State and local drunk driving
laws.
Id.; see also Alexis M. Farris, Note, LOL? Texting While Driving is No Laughing Matter:
Proposinga CoordinatedResponse to Curb this DangerousActivity, 36 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
233 (drawing similarities between DOT's actions against drunk driving and distracted driving).
13 See Linda Cosgrove, Neil Chaudhary, & Ian Reagan, Four High-Visibility Enforcement
Demonstration Waves in ConnecticutandlNew York Reduce Hand-HeldPhone Use, U.S. OF DEP'T
OF
TRANSP.
NHTSA
11,
(July
2011)
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/811845_hvedemonstrationwavesin_cnnytsfrn-july2011 .pdf (mentioning NHTSA's efforts to deter distracted driving through studies).
14 See id. at 1 (describing NHTSA's experiment to determine effective approach to curtail
texting and driving). The NHTSA developed four high-visibility enforcement demonstration
waves which allowed law enforcement from Syracuse and Hartford to patrol drivers after the media
in each state was infiltrated with enforcement-based messages. Id. The study was conducted over
a ten-month period with four intervals that were to measure the effects of the media on the drivers
with the ultimate goal of decreasing the drivers' use of hand-held phones. Id.
1s See id. (noting NHTSA's research goal).
16 See id. at 10 (noting decrease cellphone use after fourth wave).
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In conjunction with the federal government's effort to combat
driving, the National Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB"), an
and
texting
independent agency investigating major accidents in civil aviation and other
forms of transportation since 1967, made a suggestion in 2011 to all fifty
states and the District of Columbia to create a ban on texting while driving.'"
As of July 2017, the Governors Highway Safety Association, a nonprofit
organization addressing behavioral highway safety issues, collected data and
forty-seven out of fifty states, as well as the District of Columbia, Puerto
Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have banned text messaging while
driving.
HI. FACTS
Advocates against texting and driving, like the Gallatin family of
Pennsylvania, have proposed tougher legislation to local governments.19
The Appellate Division of New Jersey's Superior Court decided in Kubert v.
Best,20 that a non-driving text message sender is potentially liable for any
resulting damages of a motor vehicle accident if the party had knowledge
" See No Call, No Text, No Update Behind the Wheel: NTSB Calls ForNationwide Ban on
PEDs While Driving, NAT'L TRANSP. SAFETY BD. OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIR (Dec. 13, 2011),
https://www.ntsb.gov/news/pressreleases/Pages/No call no text noupdatebehind thewheelNTSBcallsfor nationwide ban
_onPEDs while driving.aspx (noting growth in cellphone use in transportation accidents
resulting in fatalities). The NTSB investigated accidents caused by cellphone use and other
portable electronic devices in various modes of transportation, such as collisions with a commuter
train and freight train, a motor-coach, a truck-tractor, and an airline. Id. However, the NTSB's
suggestion was triggered by the most recent incident at the time happening in Missouri. Id.
On August 5, 2010, on a section of Interstate 44 in Gray Summit, Missouri, a pickup
truck ran into the back of a truck-tractor that had slowed due to an active construction
zone. The pickup truck, in turn, was struck from behind by a school bus. That school
bus was then hit by a second school bus that had been following. As a result, two people
died and 38 others were injured. The NTSB's investigation revealed that the pickup
driver sent and received 11 text messages in the 11 minutes preceding the accident. The

last text was received moments before the pickup struck the truck-tractor.
Id.
18 See
Distracted
Driving
Laws
by
State,
GHSA.ORG,
(last
http://www.ghsa.org/sites/default/files/2017-07/DistractedDrivingLawChartJulyl7.pdf
updated July 2017) (collecting data of texting and driving laws of all U.S. states and territories).
All but four out of the forty-seven states and territories have primary enforcement. Id. A state with
primary enforcement laws may cite a driver for texting without any other traffic offense. Id.
19 See Governor Tom Wolf, Governor Wolf Signs Bill to Deter Texting and Driving,
COMMONW. OF PA (Nov. 04, 2016), https://www.governor.pa.gov/governor-wolf-signs-bill-todeter-texting-and-driving/ (noting Governor Tom Wolf's bill enhancing penalties for distracted
driving).
20 75 A.3d 1214 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
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that the motorist was driving while sending a text.2 1 In 2009, Linda and
David Kubert were severely injured after being struck by a pickup truck
driven by 18-year-old Kyle Best ("Best"). 22 The Kuberts proceeded to file a
negligence suit against the distracted driver, Best, and his friend, Shannon
Colonna ("Colonna"), who sent him the text while driving.23
The claim for compensation against Best was settled before trial and
the Kuberts appealed the trial court's dismissal of the claim brought against
Colonna. 24 The New Jersey Motor Vehicles and Traffic Regulation statute
makes hand-held use of cell phones illegal and punishable with a fine of
$100, but the statute did not address the issue faced on appeal. 25 During trial,
Colonna's attorney argued that Colonna was not present at the scene and
therefore did not have liability for the accident.2 6 The defense also argued
that Colonna did not know Best was driving and did not have a legal duty to
avoid sending the text.27 The appellate court determined that the defendant's
conduct was negligent and found Colonna owed a duty to the plaintiffs.2 8
Furthermore, the court held that more than one defendant can be the

21 See id. (stating case holding and further reasoning).
22 See id at 1219 (stating facts of case). As a result of the accident, both Linda and David
Kubert lost their left legs. Id
23 See id. (mentioning case procedural history). Kyle Best texted his friend Shannon Colonna
at 5:48 PM, just before crashing into the plaintiffs. Id. at 1220. Best received a text message one
minute prior to the crash from Colonna. Id. The Kuberts' attorney also discovered evidence of Best
and Colonna's relationship, and noted that they texted each other sixty-two times on the day of the
accident. Id. at 1219.
24 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1214 (mentioning case procedural history).
25 See N.J. STAT. § 39:4-97.3 (a) (2019) (prohibiting use of telephones in moving vehicles).
The use of a wireless telephone or electronic communication device by an operator of a
moving motor vehicle on a public road or highway shall be unlawful except when the
telephone is a hands-free wireless telephone or the electronic communication device is
used hands-free, provided that its placement does not interfere with the operation of
federally required safety equipment and the operator exercises a high degree of caution
in the operation of the motor vehicle.
Id
26 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1214 (stating defense argument).
27 See id. at 1221 (stating defense another argument of not having legal duty). The appellate
court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the jury could infer from the evidence that Colonna knew
Best was driving home from work when she was texting him. Id at 1221-22.
28 See id. at 1222 (noting court's holding). The court established that a plaintiff holding a
defendant liable for negligent conduct in a lawsuit must prove all four elements of a negligent tort
claim. Id. The elements include "(1) that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, (2) that
the defendant breached that duty, (3) that the breach was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's
injuries, and (4) that the plaintiff suffered actual compensable injuries as a result." Id
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proximate cause of a plaintiffs injuries. 29 However, additional proof is
necessary to establish the sender's liability and to do so, the plaintiff must
find that the text sender knew or had special reason to know that the driver
would read the message while driving and become distracted from operating
the vehicle.3 0 The person who sends the text to a driver is not liable for the
driver's negligence, instead the driver is responsible for his or her own
negligence created by the rules of the road.3 1 However, a text sender does
have a duty to other drivers on public roads to refrain from sending a driver
a text.32
In contrast, the New York Supreme Court of Genesee County
recently held in Vega v. Crane, a case of first impression, that a text sender
is not liable to the victim of a distracted driver.34 In 2012, Carmen Vega
("Vega") was struck by car driver, Collin Crane who died as a result of the
crash.35 Vega, the plaintiff who later brought suit to recover for injuries
caused by the accident, alleged that Collin's girlfriend, Taylor Crastley

29 See id (noting New Jersey assigns relative fault percentage under comparative negligence
§ 2A:15-5.1 (2019) (stating relevant contributory and

statute); see also N.J. REV. STAT.
comparative negligence statute).

Contributory negligence shall not bar recovery in an action by any person or his legal
representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or injury to person
or property, if such negligence was not greater than the negligence of the person against
whom recovery is sought or was not greater than the combined negligence of the persons
against whom recovery is sought. Any damages sustained shall be diminished by the
percentage sustained of negligence attributable to the person recovering.
Id. See RESTATEMENT 2D OF TORTS § 867 (1976) (explaining individual held liable if knowing
another's conduct constitutes breach of duty). The Restatement provides the following example:
"A and B participate in a riot in which B, although throwing no rocks himself, encourages A to
throw rocks. One of the rocks strikes C, a bystander. B is subject to liability to C." Id.; see also
Tarr v. Ciasulli, 853 A.2d 921, 929 (N.J. 2004) (noting New Jersey adopted Restatement approach
to determine joint liability). Contra Durkee v. C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 2d
742,745 (W.D.N.C. 2010) (citing New Jersey case used to defeat claim against remote third party).
The plaintiffs sued the manufacturer for a design defect of a text-messaging device that was
installed in a tractor. Id. The truck driver was able to view the device while driving which caused
the driver to become distracted. Id. at 753. However, the court ultimately did not hold the
manufacturer liable for the plaintiff's injuries, finding that the driver had a duty to avoid the
distraction. Id. at 754.
30 See Kubert, 74 A.3d. at 1226 (determining special reason to know requirement as part of
foreseeability test). The Kubert court compares a passenger present in the vehicle obstructing the
view of the driver to a remote text sender distracting the attention of the driver. Id. at 1227.
31 See id. at 1229 (showing how sender of text is not negligent).
32 See id. at 1229 (holding text sender liable to public).
" 49 N.Y.S.3d 264 (Sup. Ct. 2017) (comparing diverse findings).
34 See Vega v. Crane., 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 268 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (stating case holding).
35 See id. at 265 (stating facts of case).
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("Crastley"), texted him while he was driving and caused the accident. 36 The
plaintiff attempted to use the holding in Kubert as neighboring state
precedent because of the lack of precedent in New York that would protect
a third party plaintiff from harm. 37 The plaintiffs issue would have forced
the court to re-examine Palsgrafand propose an expanded interpretation of
foreseeability in negligence claims.3 ' Although the plaintiff found a recent
New York case which established a precedent permitting an expansion of
foreseeability, the court drew a distinction and limited the application of this
precedent to physicians owing a duty to the public at large and not to
texters. 39 The Court of Appeals in New York gradually expanded the duty
36 See id. at 265 (summarizing elements of case). The New York State Police discovered the
decedent's cell phone in his car, which was damaged. Id. The phone was later examined and
appeared to expose that Crastley and the decedent exchanged texts while he was driving. Id.
Crastley's lack of knowledge that decedent was driving while she sent the texts was confirmed in
an affidavit and deposition. Id.
37 See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 266 (noting use of New Jersey precedent holding texter liable for
resulting harm of distracting driver); see also Sartori v. Gregoire, 259 A.D.2d 1004, 1004 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (holding car passenger liable for verbally or physically distracting driver). Vega
attempted to use this ruling as persuasive support to help prove the remote text sender liable by
dissenting that whether the defendant was present or not, the harm is still the same. Vega, 49
N.Y.S.3d at 266; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 303 (1965) (defining negligent
act). "An act is negligent if the actor intends it to affect, or realizes or should realize that it is likely
to affect, the conduct of a third person in such a manner as to create an unreasonable risk of harm
to the other". Id. Vega sought to create a special relationship between Crastley and the plaintiff in
order to establish a duty owed by Crastley, an idea consistent with public policy in New York.
Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 267.
38 See Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928) (holding negligent
conduct resulting in injury results in liability only if reasonably foreseeable). "In every instance,
before negligence can be predicated of a given act, back of the act must be sought and found a duty
to the individual complaining, the observance of which would have averted the injury." Id. at 342;
see also Davis v. South Nassau Cmtys. Hosp., 46 N.E.3d 614, 616 (N.Y. 2015) (stating New York
precedent potentially expanded foreseeability doctrine); 79 NY. JUR. 2D Negligence § 47 (2018)
(supporting negligence law principle of imposing liability only if act is proximate cause of injury).
39 See Davis, 46 N.E.3d at 616 (applying expanded foreseeability to cases involving
physicians). An emergency room physician administered a patient Dilaudid, an opioid narcotic
pain-killer, and Ativan, a benzodiazepine drug which an expert later stated typically have
cautionary warnings for patients who are driving. Id.
at 617. The court held that a physician owes a duty to warn the patient of the drug's side effects.
Id. at 618. Thus, a physician who is responsible for warning the patient about the side effects of a
drug is liable to the public at large, because an accident is likely foreseeable when a patient is
administered impairing drugs and later operates a motor vehicle. Id. at 617. Compare Eiseman v.
State, 511 N.E.2d 1128, 1134-36 (N.Y. 1987) (declining duty of State to treat claimants like
physicians), with Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 350 (Cal. 1976) (noting
physician's duty to warn when serious danger of violence is known). In Eiseman, the parolee was
being treated for mental disorders while incarcerated, in which after his release, parolee enrolled
into college where he raped and murdered a student. 511 N.E.2d at 1130-31. The court concluded
that "the physician plainly owed a duty of care to his patient and to persons he knew or reasonably
should have known were relying on him for this service to his patient. The physician did not,
however, undertake a duty to the community at large." Id. at 1135. In Tarasoff, the psychologist
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owed to individuals but always required the existence of a special
relationship between the plaintiff and the injured defendant.4 0 However,
taking into consideration the New York Court of Appeals' caution of
expanding the concept of duty, the Vega Court decided not to expand liability
is
to individuals who send a text, as "the potential expansion ...
4
astronomical." 1
IV. ANALYSIS
Creating a duty that is not over-broad and imposing that duty
inevitably results in a danger of potentially finding liability for non-driving
text senders who should not be held liable.42 Kubert sets out a bright line
ruling which appropriately distinguishes that someone who texts a driver is
not automatically liable versus a texter who knows or has special reason to
know that the driver is operating a motor vehicle at the time the text is sent.4 3
A misinterpretation of this rule could easily lead to the liability of a person
who did not have knowledge that the person was driving." However, this
rule can be applied to a case where a third party did have knowledge or
special reason to know that a person was driving, thus resorting to the
expense of litigation, which entails carefully sifting through records of texts
viewed in order to demonstrate that the texter knew that the person was
driving.4 5 If discovery were to go as far as viewing text messages, and the
was told by the psychiatric patient his intention to kill a victim. 551 P.2d at 350. The court held
that he had a duty to warn because the psychologists had special knowledge of patient's intent to
kill decedent. Id. at 351.
0 See Tenuto v. Lederle Lab., 687 N.E.2d 1300, 1301 (N.Y. 1997) (discussing doctor's duty
extends to members of household if contagious disease involved); Cohen v. Cabrini Med. Ctr., 730
N.E.2d 949, 952 (N.Y. 2000) (explaining doctor not liable for patient's voluntary election to
undergo procedure not in doctors control); Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055,
1068 (N.Y. 2001) (holding gun manufacturer had no duty to injured victim through marketing and
distribution of guns); McNulty v. City of New York, 792 N.E.2d 162, 167 (N.Y. 2003) (explaining
doctors have no duty to guests of their patients).
41 See Vega, 49 N.Y.S. at 271 (stating court's reluctance to expand duty any further).
[T]exts are routinely sent to, for example, advise the public of breaking news, that
prescriptions are ready for pick up, or that a bill is to be paid, the sender would be
responsible for any injuries that could be caused should a driver become distracted by
their receipt. With texting being as so prevalent, the potential expansion as contemplated
by the plaintiff is astronomical.
Id.
42 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227 (hesitating to impose broaden scope of liability) (quoting Estate

of Desir ex. Rel Estiverne v. Vertus, 69 A.3d 1247 (N.J. 2013)).
43 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1226 (establishing rule with special knowledge requirement).
4 See id. (establishing rule).
4 See id. at 1220 (reviewing messages sent by remote texter to driver for proof of knowledge).
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records do not plainly identify that the texter knew the person was driving,
finding extrinsic evidence to determine the texter's exact knowledge of the
drivers whereabouts would be an extreme undertaking.'
The decision in Kubert v. Best holds that a non-driving text sender
owes a limited duty of care to a plaintiff injured by a distracted driver.4 7
However, there must be evidence to prove that the remote texter breached
their duty, and the plaintiff must consider the efforts in determining evidence
about whether the texter knew if the recipient was driving at the time.48 As
the concurring opinion noted, persuading the judge that the remote texter
breached a duty is a difficult task.49 The concurring opinion validly
recognized that the driver has the ultimate responsibility of obeying traffic
laws and avoiding distractions that are either present in the car or at a remote
location.o
One of the several arguments that the plaintiffs asserted to show that
the defendant owed a duty of care was their suggestion that the defendant
'6
See id. at 525 (Epinosa, J. concurrence) (explaining difficulty in determining remote texter's
awareness of tortious activity under aiding and abetting theory). Although the concurring opinion
points out the difficulty in measuring the remote texter's awareness of having a role in a tortious
activity of distracting the driver under an aiding and abetting theory, being able to determine the
remote texter's knowledge would be equally difficult, even if the aiding and abetting theory did not
apply. Id.
4 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1228 (concluding remote texters owe limited duty to third party
injured by distracted driver). The court followed the traditions of tort law in stating that establishing
a duty is a question of law for the court to decide. Id. at 1229. The court also noted that "[l]imiting
the duty to persons who have such knowledge will not require that the sender of a text predict in
every instance how a recipient will act." Id. at 1228.
48 See id. at 1223 (considering when a duty exists).

[W]hether a person owes a duty of reasonable care toward another turns on whether the
imposition of such a duty satisfies an abiding sense of basic fairness under all of the
circumstances in light of considerations of public policy. That inquiry involves
identifying, weighing, and balancing several factors - the relationship of the parties, the
nature of the attendant risk, the opportunity and ability to exercise care, and the public
interest in the proposed solution...
Id.
49 See id. at 1229 ("[T]he bar set by the majority for the imposition of liability is high and will
rarely be met since the duty created arises when the conduct of a person, not in an automobile,
interferes with the driver's operation of the vehicle."). Id.
50 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1230 (discussing driver's responsibilities).

[T]he driver carries the personal responsibility to obey traffic laws and exercise
appropriate care for the safety of others. This responsibility includes the obligation to
avoid or ignore distractions created by other persons, whether in the automobile or at a
remote location, that impair the driver's ability to exercise appropriate care for the safety
of others. Text messages received while driving plainly constitute a distraction the driver
must ignore.
Id.
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aided and abetted the distracted driver to violate the law." The court
accurately held that there was not enough evidence to prove liability under
an aiding and abetting theory.52 In order to demonstrate that an aiding and
abetting issue existed, the plaintiff will have to show with whatever evidence
is available, that the defendant is liable for giving substantial assistance or
taking affirmative steps to get the driver to violate the legal duty of driving
carefully on the road.5 3 Given that the Kuberts did not find evidence
available to support their argument, the court stated that a plaintiff dealing
with a similar cases would have to look at the "aiders" knowledge of the
whereabouts of the driver.54 This knowledge requirement mentioned by the
court is in fact a logical standard to go by in determining a text-sender's
liability.s" As the plaintiff argued that a passenger in the car has the same
duty as the remote texter in knowing not to distract the driver, to which the
majority opinion agreed, the concurrence provided that a passenger in the car
naturally has a precise awareness of the driver's conduct than a remote
texter.56 Even though the majority did not encourage the future use of an
aiding and abetting theory, the prospect of making a remote texter's
awareness equal to a present passengers awareness of a driver's conduct is
unfair.57

See id. at 1223 (arguing remote texter "electronically present"). As the attempt to compare
5
the remote texter to a passenger present in the car distracting the driver was argued to the court, the
plaintiff said the remote texter was "electronically present." Id. The court did not find any evidence
that the remote texter encouraged the driver to violate his duty of driving carefully. Id. The act of
sending a text is not sufficient enough to qualify as encouragement. Id. at 1224.
52 See id. at 1225 (dismissing plaintiffs' theory).
5 See id. (discussing aiding and abetting issue).
We reviewed Restatement § 876 and held that the passengers could be found liable for
giving 'substantial assistance' to the driver in failing to fulfill his legal duty to remain at
the scene of the accident and to notify the police. We found 'an aiding and abetting
theory' to be viable because the passengers had taken 'affirmative steps in the immediate

aftermath [of the accident] to conceal their involvement' and to encourage the driver's
violation of the law.
Id. (citingPodias v. Mais, 926 A.2d 859, 868 (N.J. App. 2007)).
54 See id at 1220 (showing difficulty in determining driver's whereabouts through text). The
plaintiff would have to show, with extrinsic evidence, that the remote texter knew that the recipient
was actually driving. Id at 1220-21. In Kubert, the court noted that Colonna was a young teenager
who texted on average, 100 times per day. Id. at 1220. The court also stated that Colonna did not
pay attention to whether the recipient of her texts was driving a car. Id. The majority highlighted
the difficulty in plaintiffs attempt to come by this type of information. Id.
5 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1227 (assessing standard of having knowledge or special reason to
know driver is distracted).
56 See id. at 1231-32 (comparing passenger and remote texters' awareness of drivers conduct).
1 See id. (acknowledging fault in aiding and abetting argument).
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The Supreme Court of New York heard similar arguments brought
by a plaintiff who sought to create a duty of care owed by a texter, but
appropriately declined to do so." New York has followed its established
precedent of creating a duty of care when the injuries caused by the
defendant's careless conduct are those that might have been foreseeable by
a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence. 9 That precedent originating
from Palsgraf, stands as an immense barrier to which a plaintiff will have a
hard time overcoming in any New York court.o
The argument raised in the Vega case was based on the same
arguments presented in the Kubert case." The court in New Jersey compared
the distractions from a passenger present in the car to the distractions
stemming from a remote texter.6 2 The New York court completely rejected
this comparison in holding that a remote texter cannot have first-hand
knowledge of the driver's conduct, further denying that the remote texter's
knowledge of the driving could be determined by reviewing the texting
records.63 The New York court correctly interpreted the concept of
controlling the expansion of duty, as the future consequences of such an
expansion would create a vast amount of duties owed to unknown persons.'
V. CONCLUSION
The NHTSA's efforts have gone as far as preventing drivers from
being distracted by their cellphones through infiltrating the media to send
messages of awareness about the dangers caused from texting while driving.
However, preventing persons in remote locations who are texting people
while they are driving is a feat which has been brought out by cases reaching
two different results. On one end, holding a remote text sender liable to third
parties is permissible if the correct evidence is discovered. The other end
See Vega v. Crane, 49 N.Y.S.3d 264, 266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017) (attempting to use Kubert
precedent as persuasive authority).
59 See id. at 267 (discussing foreseeability of damages). "The injuries or the damages
complained of must have been those which might have been foreseen by a person of ordinary
intelligence and prudence, although not necessarily in the precise form in which they occurred." Id
(citing Kellogg v. Church Charity Found. of Long Island, 96 N.E. 406 (N.Y. 1911).
60 See Vega, 49 N.Y.S.3d at 266 (stating courts disfavor of reexamining established precedent
from Palsgrafcase).
61 See id. at 268 (denying use of reasoning set out in Kubert
case).
62 See Kubert, 75 A.3d at 1231 (finding present passenger who may distract has
knowledge
more so than remote texter).
63 See Vega, 49 N.Y.S. at 269 (holding remote texter deprived of firsthand knowledge).
6
See id. at 269 (denying expansion of duty). In Davis, the medical providers owed a duty to
third-party motorists because the risk of a patient taking a drug after a procedure and driving
afterwards could potentially cause an accident. Id. This expansion was justified because there was
a warning label written on the drug for the medical provider to follow. Id
58
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holds that the evidence would involve expanding a scope of liability which
is too far removed from the set precedent in Palsgraf The New York court's
precedent has been followed in many jurisdictions and going against this
tradition would not be favorable to practitioners who have heavily relied on
this precedent.
Unfortunately, the details in determining a non-driving texter's
liability is a far stretch for a plaintiff's counsel which leaves a victim with a
very high burden of proof. Pinpointing the texter's knowledge or reason to
know that a driver was operating the vehicle while reading and responding
to a text involves more guessing than proof of a conclusive nature.
Reviewing the phone records of plaintiff and defendant may bring one closer
to an answer, but the remaining issue would be whether to expand the scope
of liability. This also would be similar to holding a remote texter to the same
standard of awareness as a passenger present in the car. Overall, the New
York Supreme Court correctly rejected the arguments brought by the
plaintiffs.
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